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Recent elections have featured various politicians directly appealing to the working class, yet we 
know little about how citizens react to class appeals from candidates. We investigate this 
question using survey experiments conducted in the United States and Denmark. We show that 
symbolic class rhetoric substantially influences candidate evaluations and ultimately polarizes 
these evaluations across class lines. We also unpack how class appeals work and find that while 
they increase perceptions of representation among working class voters, they have a more limited 
effect on perceptions of candidates’ ideological position. Our results help explain how class 
affects voter decision-making and contribute to broader discussions about the role of political 
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Social class was the dominant political cleavage in most industrialized societies for much 
of the twentieth century and appeals to class constituencies, notably appeals to the working class 
by leftist politicians, were a standard feature of most elections. Nonetheless, election results 
became less dependent on the shrinking working class as the millennium approached. Politicians, 
especially those on the left, talked less about class in their campaign rhetoric and voting behavior 
depolarized along class lines (Best, 2011; Evans & Tilley, 2017; Thau, 2019). This led some to 
argue that class politics was dying if not dead already (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Clark, 
Lipset, & Rempel, 1993; Listhaug, 1997; but see Bartels 2016, Hout 2008, and Piston 2018 for a 
contrasting take).  
Recent elections provide a reason to revisit the role of social class in candidate 
evaluations. On a number of occasions, high-profile politicians have talked about class politics 
and appealed directly to the working class in their campaign rhetoric. In the US, Senator Bernie 
Sanders characterized his run for the Presidency as a “campaign of the working class, by the 
working class, and for the working class” (Medina & Ember, 2020). In Britain, former Labour 
leader Jeremy Corbyn declared that Labour was “back as the political voice of the working 
class” and would “put the interests of working-class people centre stage” (BBC, 2018). These 
examples are not particularly rare. In fact, class rhetoric is still quite common among left-wing 
political elites in the US, Britain, and Scandinavia (Horn, Kevins, Jensen, & Kersbergen, n.d.; 
Rhodes & Johnson, 2017; Thau, 2019). Working class appeals also figure prominently in debates 
concerning the success of right-wing populist politicians such as Marine Le Pen in France, Luigi 
Di Maio in Italy, and Donald Trump in the US (Lamont, Park, & Ayala-Hurtado, 2017; Mutz, 




Existing work does not provide direct evidence about this important question. While 
there is a burgeoning literature focused on the effects of group appeals in campaign rhetoric, this 
work focuses primarily on gender, race, and religion, not class (Hersh & Schaffner, 2013; 
Holman, Schneider, & Pondel, 2015; Kam, Archer, & Geer, 2017; Ostfeld, 2019; Philpot, 2007; 
Swigger, 2012; Weber & Thornton, 2012).1 Likewise, recent work about how the class 
background of a candidate influences voter preferences says little about whether politicians can 
effectively use appeals to social classes and specifically the working class (Carnes & Lupu, 
2016; Carnes & Sadin, 2015; Evans & Tilley, 2017; Heath, 2015, 2018; Vivyan, Wagner, 
Glinitzer, & Eberl, 2020). This impedes our understanding of electoral strategies as politicians 
can strategically alter their campaign rhetoric, but not their social background.  
We argue that candidates can shape voter perceptions through direct and symbolic 
working class appeals. Specifically, we show that appeals to the working class attract working 
class voters and that this has the almost inevitable effect of increasing class polarization in 
voters’ candidate evaluations. Our evidence comes from two studies (total N = 5,415). In Study 
1, respondents in both Denmark and the US were asked to evaluate either a candidate who made 
no appeal to any social class or a candidate who made a policy-less symbolic appeal to the 
working class containing only an assertion that it is time to ‘prioritize’ the working class over the 
 
1 Two recent studies partly focus on class-based campaign appeals. First, Hersh and Schaffner (2013) include ‘the 
middle class’ in their study of micro-targeting. However, they use the middle class as a reference group and thus 
cannot say whether this type of appeal improves evaluations over and above a more generic appeal. Second, Swigger 
(2012) explores how pictures of blue collar workers in campaign advertisements influence the perceived ideology of 
the candidate. Swigger finds that these images influence perceptions, but only in the absence of information about 
the candidate’s party. We build on this study by focusing on non-visual appeals and by exploring a broader range of 
evaluations. Unlike both existing studies, we also move beyond the US case.  
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upper middle class. We find that such working class appeals substantially influenced subsequent 
candidate impressions in both countries. Working class voters rated candidates more positively if 
they made an appeal to the working class, whereas upper middle class voters barely reacted to 
such class rhetoric. The result was a polarization of perceptions across the class structure. In 
Study 2, we replicate this initial finding in Denmark using a different dependent variable and 
examine the relative influence of symbolic appeals to the working class compared to policy 
statements. Here, we find that symbolic appeals are as effective as policy-centered appeals. 
Finally, we use evidence from both studies to consider why symbolic working class appeals 
influence impressions. We show that symbolic appeals matter mainly due to their influence on 
perceptions of candidates’ willingness to represent the group rather than their influence on 
perceptions of candidates’ left-right policy positions.  
We make three contributions. First, we extend the literature on group-based campaign 
appeals concerning racial, gender, and religious groups by expanding the focus to social class 
groups. Second, we provide stronger causal evidence for the role of political elites in structuring 
the relationship between social class and vote choice, thereby going beyond studies using 
observational data (Evans & Tilley, 2012b, 2012a, 2017; Thau, n.d.). Third, we identify a novel 
way through which symbolic group appeals work: perceptions of group representation. We thus 
also contribute to the broader literature on group cleavages in voting behavior by emphasizing 
the role of political elites in cultivating group polarization (Achen & Bartels, 2016).  
Symbolic Group Appeals 
 Politicians frequently appeal to social groups. Recent studies on political rhetoric in the 
US, Britain, and the Scandinavian countries report that party manifestos, political speeches, and 
campaign advertisements are, to a substantial degree, dedicated to group appeals (Elder & 
6 
 
Phillips, 2017; Evans & Tilley, 2017; Horn et al., n.d.; Nteta & Schaffner, 2013; Rhodes & 
Johnson, 2017; Thau, 2018). Our primary concern is with the effect of symbolic group appeals on 
subsequent voter preferences. By symbolic appeals, we mean a political communication in which 
a politician casts themselves as an ally of some social group but absent much, if any, elaboration 
of policy. Consider two examples of real direct mail communication by candidates cited by 
Hersch and Schaffner (2013, pp. 524–525): “A Voice for Working America” and “Standing up 
for Maine’s Working Families.” In neither case does the message convey what this “voice” will 
say on behalf of working Americans or what the politician “stands” for. Symbolic appeals of this 
sort may be particularly attractive to politicians insofar as they enable them to communicate 
information that bolsters their electoral fortunes, while also avoiding alienating voters by 
maintaining ambiguity about policy positions (Dickson & Scheve, 2006; but see, Hersh & 
Schaffner, 2013). Although candidates also appeal to groups via policy statements, a focus on 
symbolic appeals provides a direct window on the effect of specifically appealing to a social 
group.2 
  Although politicians make symbolic appeals to groups in their campaign rhetoric, our 
knowledge regarding the influence of these appeals is still limited in at least three important 
respects and particularly so when it concerns class-based appeals. First, existing work has 
primarily explored the prevalence of class-based appeals rather than their influence (Evans & 
Tilley, 2017; Rhodes & Johnson, 2017; Thau, 2019). Second, we know little about how such 
appeals compare to the traditional ‘currency’ of the political market, i.e. appeals explicitly 
focused on policy (Kitschelt, 2011, p. 620; but see, Thau, n.d.). Are they more or less effective? 
 
2 In our analysis, we also consider policy-centric working class appeals to compare the relative influence of direct 
symbolic appeals and explicit policy statements. 
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Prior studies on targeted group appeals in campaign rhetoric typically randomize the presence or 
absence of a group appeal but do not separately randomize whether a policy statement is also 
presented and thus do not speak to this question (Hersh & Schaffner, 2013; Kam et al., 2017; 
Ostfeld, 2019; Swigger, 2012; Weber & Thornton, 2012). Finally, we do not know how symbolic 
class appeals influence voters. What is it that voters infer from such appeals? To what extent are 
class appeals used to infer candidates’ policy positions and/or their willingness to represent 
working class voters? These are the questions that we wish to answer. 
Do Class Appeals Work? 
In considering whether and how symbolic class appeals influence candidate evaluations, 
we ground our theory in the literature on group-centrism and public opinion (Achen & Bartels, 
2016; Conover, 1988; Converse, 1964; Green, Palmquist, & Schickler, 2004; Lupu, 2014; 
Nelson & Kinder, 1996). Attitudes toward a social group such as the working class will influence 
opinions when two conditions are met. First, people need to have some beliefs about the social 
group. They need to either like or dislike the group, or at least have a view about the group’s 
interests. People can then use these beliefs to form evaluations of a political object, such as a 
candidate. Second, people need “some interstitial ‘linking’ information indicating why a given 
party or policy is relevant to the group” (Converse, 1964, pp. 236–237). Class-related attitudes 
are unlikely to substantively influence subsequent behavior if these two conditions are not met.  
 Various studies show that most people in Western democracies meet the first condition as 
they still maintain attitudes toward, and beliefs about, social classes. Social class continues to 
structure people’s lives including their education, friendships and marriages, health, and lifestyle 
choices (Bennett et al., 2009; Elo, 2009; Goldthorpe & Jackson, 2008; Schwartz & Mare, 2005). 
Meanwhile, the vast majority of people still identify with a particular class and think about 
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society in class terms (Bartels, 2016; Hout, 2008; Piston, 2018). People also vary quite markedly 
in their emotional reactions to different social classes. The working class, for instance, is 
consistently rated more positively on group stereotype measures pertaining to warmth than are 
the rich (Fiske, 2019; Robison & Stubager, 2018). Likewise, the working class is consistently the 
most positively evaluated social group asked about by the ANES in its feeling thermometer 
battery (Bartels, 2016, p. 114). In 2012, for instance, the average rating for the working class was 
82 compared with 76 for the middle class and 50 for the rich. A wide array of evidence thus 
suggests that people still possess attitudes towards classes that they can use in decision making.  
 While there is good reason to think that people possess beliefs about classes that they 
could use to inform their impressions of candidates, the class politics literature suggests greater 
skepticism about their application. While some scholars maintain that class is still politically 
important (Hout, 2008), others point to a decline in class voting to argue that social classes have 
lost much, if not all, of their psychological relevance for political behavior (Beck & Beck-
Gernsheim, 2002; Clarke, Sanders, Stewart, & Whitely, 2004; Franklin, 1992; Kingston, 2000). 
Dalton (2008, pp. 156–157) sums up this latter perspective when arguing that “the political cues 
provided by traditional class groups” are “simply less relevant to today’s voters”. This relevance, 
however, is influenced by politicians. Class may be seen as less relevant when parties converge 
to the ideological middle or emphasize post-material issue concerns (Elff, 2007, 2009; Evans & 
Tilley, 2012a, 2012b). Likewise, a declining share of working class politicians robs voters of a 
class cue that could activate class attitudes (Carnes, 2013; Heath, 2015, 2018). Or, as we argue, a 
declining focus on class in campaign rhetoric could undermine its perceived relevance for voting 
behavior (Evans & Tilley, 2017; Thau, 2019). Voting based on class, or any other relevant social 
cleavage, thus has an important ‘top-down’ component.  
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Politicians may be reluctant to move away from the ideological center lest they alienate 
voters (Adams & Somer-Topcu, 2009; Hall, 2015). At the same time, politicians cannot change 
their class background to cue people to think in class-based terms. However, politicians can 
appeal to a particular class in their political communications. We argue that these appeals should 
influence subsequent candidate impressions. The use of phrases such as ‘the working class’ 
should automatically activate associated mental constructs (Lodge & Taber, 2013). In turn, these 
class attitudes will be linked to the candidate when the candidate signals they are allied with the 
class.3 Symbolic appeals provide the opportunity to apply one’s class-related beliefs to political 
evaluations and a reason to do so.  
We expect that the impact of symbolic working class appeals will vary by voters’ own 
class identification with important consequences for the presence of class polarization in 
candidate evaluations. Individuals who identify as a member of the working class tend to report 
more positive views of their social group than those who identify higher up the class ladder due 
to identity-based motivations to favor one’s in-group (Huddy, 2013; Robison & Stubager, 2018). 
Consequently, appeals to the working class should translate into greater levels of support among 
members of the working class, while those at the opposite end of the class spectrum are unlikely 
to be moved or may even react negatively (Hersh & Schaffner, 2013; Ostfeld, 2019; although, 
see Holman Schneider and Pondel 2015 and Kam, Archer, and Geer 2017). The result is greater 
class polarization in candidate evaluations. This leads to our first two hypotheses: 
 
 
3 Of course, some people will think that there is a link between social classes and political parties to begin with 
given the important role played by class groups in party images (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960; 
Stonecash, 2000). When consistent with the prior belief, a class appeal is likely to activate and strengthen this link. 
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H1: Symbolic working class appeals lead to greater candidate support from working 
class voters.  
 
H2: Symbolic working class appeals polarize candidate evaluations along class lines. 
 
 
Note that H2 can find support if only the working class changes its evaluations in 
response to a working class appeal while higher classes are unaffected or if the two classes move 
in opposite directions. Given the absence of prior knowledge on this point, we are agnostic as to 
which pattern might materialize. 
We expect that symbolic working class appeals will influence subsequent candidate 
evaluations. But how do these messages compare to appeals more explicitly focused on the 
policies of candidates? On the one hand, it is plausible that symbolic appeals will be less 
influential. Politicians believe that policy matters as they strategically highlight issues when they 
hold popular positions, but change the topic or remain ambiguous otherwise (Canes-Wrone, 
2006; Grimmer, 2013). Voting behavior is also not as policy-less as some accounts might allege 
(Ansolabehere, Rodden, & Snyder, 2008). On the other hand, there is reason to expect that 
symbolic appeals may match, or even outweigh, the influence of explicit policy appeals. A long 
line of research demonstrates the power of social groups in affecting policy opinions and 
candidate evaluations particularly for an electorate lacking knowledge about how to connect 
policy particulars to underlying interests (Achen & Bartels, 2016; Conover, 1988; Nicholson, 
2011). In addition, the symbolic nature of symbolic appeals enables a politician to potentially 
avoid alienating voters who disagree with them on policy particulars (Dickson & Scheve, 2006). 
Because there is no prior evidence with direct bearing on this question, and because the 




H3a: Symbolic working class appeals have a greater effect on candidate support than 
policy-centered appeals. 
 
H3b: Symbolic working class appeals have a weaker effect on candidate support than 
policy-centered appeals. 
 
How Do Class Appeals Work? 
 A politician who claims that they are “A Voice for Working America” presumably does 
so because they believe this message communicates something appealing to voters. But what 
kind of information do voters infer from symbolic (working) class appeals? There are two 
possibilities. First, class appeals may lead people to consider the policy consequences of 
supporting the candidate as they call upon their class stereotypes to infer the policy priorities of 
the candidate (Carnes & Sadin, 2015; Hersh & Schaffner, 2013; Swigger, 2012). Appealing to 
the working class may be taken as a commitment to leftist policy positions. If a class appeal 
changes a candidate’s evaluation, it may therefore be due to the perceived ideology of the 
candidate.   
 
H4: Symbolic working class appeals will lead people to place a politician further to the 
left. 
 
At the same time, class appeals may not link that neatly to ideology since most voters have 
diffuse understandings of political ideologies (Bauer, Barbera, Ackermann, & Venetz, 2017; 
Caughey, O’Grady, & Warshaw, 2019; Converse, 1964). A recent comment by then Labour 
leader Jeremy Corbyn suggests an alternative mechanism that may also be at work. He claimed 
that a fire in a London tower block revealed that “working-class people’s voices are ignored; 
their concerns dismissed by those in power” (Morley 2017). Corbyn’s remarks are not an attempt 
to signal that he has the correct policy position, but that he has the correct representational 
position towards the working class. The importance of these types of beliefs frequently appear in 
12 
 
the literature on voter decision making. For example, Cramer (2016) highlights how a sense that 
policy is made elsewhere and ‘communicated outward’ without consultation is key to class-
tinged discontent among rural people. Elected officials are keen to burnish a sense of 
identification between themselves and constituents via self-presentational strategies (Fenno, 
1978). And beliefs about the intentions of candidates and elected officials, i.e. how hard they will 
work on behalf of constituents, are an important influence on subsequent evaluations (Bittner, 
2011; Laustsen & Bor, 2017). From this standpoint, a working class appeal may signal to 
working class voters that the politician stands for ‘their sort of people’ and thus can be trusted to 
act in the broader interests of the group. 
 
H5: Symbolic working class appeals will improve perceptions of group 
representation among working class people. 
 
Note that this mechanism is different from the representational logic investigated 
by Heath (2015, 2018). Heath focuses on how the potential for descriptive representation 
– i.e., that working class voters can vote for candidates from their own class – influences 
the strength of class on vote choice and turnout. In contrast, the logic we are investigating 
is more akin to Pitkin’s (1967) concept of ‘symbolic representation’ where the focus is not 
on the sociodemographic similarity between voters and candidates, but on whether 
candidates are ‘being-believed-in or accepted-as’ class representatives (Pitkin, 1967, p. 
104).  
Study 1: Working Class Appeals in Denmark and the United States 
We fielded survey experiments in Denmark and the United States to explore how 
symbolic working class appeals influence candidate evaluations. The two countries are similar in 
13 
 
that individual candidates play a role in elections.4 Nonetheless, Denmark and the US differ 
greatly in almost every other way. The US is a much more ethnically diverse country. This may 
weaken class divisions, especially insofar as it may incentivize right-leaning elites to focus on 
alternative social cleavages as an electoral strategy (Solt, 2011; Tavits & Letki, 2014). The US is 
also much more economically unequal. While an intuitive argument would hold that higher 
levels of inequality would increase class conflict (Meltzer & Scott, 1981), recent work suggests 
that inequality may actually depress support for government redistribution (Benabou, 2001; 
Kelly & Enns, 2010). Finally, the US party system is much more polarized (Elder, Thomas, and 
Arter 1998; Iyengar and Krupenkin 2018). The salience of partisanship in the US case may act as 
a drag on potential class appeal effects. If we find evidence that class rhetoric matters in these 
two rather different contexts, it suggests that this is a generalizable phenomenon.    
The Danish survey took place in June 2017 with a national sample recruited from 
YouGov (n=2,025). We oversampled both working class and upper middle class respondents to 
ensure sufficient variation in our key moderator variable: social class identity (Druckman & 
Kam, 2011). The US survey, meanwhile, took place in March 2018 using a sample recruited 
from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) crowdsourcing platform. MTurk has become a 
common method for generating broadly representative convenience samples, especially as 
validation studies have shown that treatment effects in MTurk studies closely resemble those 
found using national random samples (Mullinix, Leeper, Freese, & Druckman, 2015). The 
MTurk experiment was conducted as a two-wave panel study. We first recruited 3,031 
respondents to take a survey in which they answered questions relating to their social class, 
partisanship, ideological views, and demographic characteristics. To maximize variation in social 
 
4 In Denmark, it is also possible to vote for a party without choosing a specific candidate. 
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class we then invited all lower, working, upper middle, and upper class respondents, as well as a 
random sample of lower middle and middle class respondents, to take a second survey a few 
days later. Ultimately, 1,884 respondents took part in both surveys. We provide sample 
characteristics in Online Appendix A (Tables OA1 and OA2).  
In both settings respondents were randomly assigned across a 2 (Candidate Partisanship) 
x 2 (Class Appeal: None, Working Class) design wherein they were asked to evaluate a 
candidate for the Danish parliament/the US House of Representatives named Klaus Hansen 
(Denmark) or Dennis Williams (the US).5 The partisanship of the candidate was randomly 
assigned such that he was from either the main right-wing party (Venstre in Denmark; the 
Republicans in the US) or the main left-wing party (the Social Democrats in Denmark; the 
Democrats in the US). The presence of the party cue is crucial. It provides an anchor against 
which respondents can evaluate the candidate in the absence of a class appeal (Goggin, 
Henderson, & Theodoridis, 2019). More importantly, as people are likely to already have some 
beliefs about the relationship between parties and social classes (Nicholson and Segura 2012), 
the party cue also means that we can tell whether candidates from left and right parties can both 
appeal to the same class or if their existing reputations swamp such appeals.  
 
5 In both survey experiments in Study 1, we also included another class appeal condition where the politician 
appealed to the upper middle class. Symbolic appeals directly targeting the upper middle class are less common than 
working class appeals. However, we included this appeal to provide a further test of the scope conditions of our 
theory. We provide analyses of this treatment in Online Appendix B. Upper middle class appeals alienated working 
class respondents, but had no clear impact on respondents higher up the class ladder. As a result, these appeals also 
led to greater polarization in candidate impressions.  
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Our most important manipulation concerns the class appeal the candidate did, or did not, 
make. Below is the full text that respondents were given. Those assigned to the No Class Appeal 
condition only got the first paragraph while respondents assigned to the Working Class Appeal 
condition received both.  
[Dennis Williams/Klaus Hansen] is running for a seat in the [U.S. House of 
Representatives/ Folketinget] as a member of the [Democratic/Republican or 
Social Democratic/Venstre] Party.  
 
[Williams/Hansen] recently said: “Too much attention has been given to the upper 
middle class in recent political debates. We in the [Democratic / Republican or 
Social Democratic / Venstre] Party believe it is time for politicians to prioritize 
people from the working class like construction workers and cleaners. 6 
 
  
This type of appeal echoes the language of Bernie Sanders and Jeremy Corbyn mentioned 
above. Importantly, it contains no overt policy language, enabling us to ascertain whether 
respondents still meaningfully respond to the group as a symbol.  
 
6 The wording in the Danish and US samples differed in two small ways. First, the Danish treatments concluded 
with “for a fairer Denmark”. We omitted this phrasing in the US (and in our second Danish) study, in case this 
phrase added an additional ideological signal. Second, the Danish working class appeal also featured a reference to 
the lower middle class. The results in both countries are remarkably similar despite these differences. One question 
that may arise concerns the worker categories in these appeals (construction workers, cleaners): are our results 
responses to their presence? We fielded a US survey with 504 MTurk respondents and a Danish survey with 513 
YouGov respondents in 2017 to address this question. We asked respondents to evaluate the worker categories as 
well as the working class itself on 0-10 scales (higher = more positive evaluations). There was little difference in 
evaluations between the working class itself (USmean = 7.4; Denmarkmean = 7.6) and the worker categories 
(construction workers: 7.0 (US) and 7.3 (Denmark); cleaners: 7.1 (US) and 7.4 (Denmark). This suggest that the 
worker categories did not provide a treatment themselves; they only served as examples of working class jobs. 
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Our core dependent variable is the respondent’s overall evaluation of the politician. 
Respondents were asked how they would “rate a candidate with political views like those of 
[Klaus Hansen/Dennis Williams]” on a 0-10 scale where 0 “means that you think very poorly of 
him and 10 means that you think very highly of him”  (the scale is recoded to 0-1 in the 
analyses).7 Our hypotheses also require a measure of social class to investigate whether the class 
appeal treatments prompt greater class polarization relative to the no class appeal baseline. Since 
the processes implicated by our hypotheses are subjective in nature – i.e., they work through 
voters’ mental processing of the candidates’ appeals – we opted for a subjective measure of 
class. Thus, we asked respondents about their class identification at the beginning of the Danish 
survey, and therefore before the experiment, and on a previous wave of the US survey to avoid 
issues of post-treatment bias (Montgomery, Nyhan, & Torres, 2018).8 Specifically, respondents 
were asked to indicate whether they belonged to the lower, working, lower middle, middle, upper 
middle, or upper class. Following previous work (Robison and Stubager 2018), we collapse these 
responses into four categories: lower/working, lower middle, middle, and upper middle/upper 
class.9 We concentrate on the comparison between lower/working and upper middle/upper 
respondents in the analysis that follows, but Appendix A (Table OA15 and Figures OA3-OA4) 
also shows the results for those who identify with the lower middle or middle class. The effects 
 
7 We also asked respondents in the US experiment to indicate their vote intentions regarding the candidate on a 0-10 
scale. We focus on the thermometer in the text to maintain comparability with the Danish experiment. Table OA5 in 
Appendix A provides analyses of the alternative measure: the same patterns emerge.   
8 A series of buffer items came between the social class item and the experiment in the Danish case, including the 
respondents’ responses to seven political values questions, ideological self-placement, and several political 
knowledge items.  
9 The same patterns emerge if we do not merge classes in this way (see Online Appendix D).  
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for these groups are somewhere in between the two extreme groups included in the figures 
below.  
We also investigated two other types of class variables as moderators. First, we replaced 
class identification with two measures of respondents’ objective class position: income and 
occupation (coded according to the EGP class schema). As shown in Appendix E (Figures OE1-
OE5 and Tables OE1-OE4) our results are very similar using these two alternative measures of 
objective class. Second, we used a measure of class affect: sympathy for either the working or 
upper middle class (see Piston 2018). This is shown in Figure OE6 and Table OE5 in Appendix 
E. Class identification is still important even when controlling for class affect (see Figure OE7). 
We return to the results of these additional analyses in the conclusion. 
Results 
Figure 1 plots the average difference in candidate evaluations between those receiving a 
working class appeal and those in the baseline condition by candidate partisanship and separately 
for working and upper middle class respondents; the regression analyses behind the figures are in 
Tables OA3/4. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, working class respondents evaluated the candidate 
significantly more positively when a working class oriented appeal was present than when it was 
absent. The effect of the working class appeal is substantially large in all four cases, with 
working class respondents evaluating the candidate making a working class appeal 0.2-0.3 points 
higher on the 0-1 scale. While the working class appeal had a large substantive effect regardless 
of party, there is some evidence in Figure 1 that ‘unexpected’ appeals, e.g. a right-wing party 
appealing to the working class, matter more. This may be because these counter-intuitive appeals 





Figure 1: Symbolic Working Class Appeals Influence Candidate Evaluations, Study 1 
 
Notes: Markers provide the difference in evaluations compared to the no class appeal baseline 
with 95% confidence intervals by party treatment with left-wing parties (Social Democrats and 
Democrats) presented separately from right-wing parties (Venstre and Republicans). See Tables 
OA3/OA4 for full model results.  
 
One notable deviation does stand out in Figure 1. While upper middle class respondents 
were not significantly affected by the working class appeal in Denmark and when a Democrat in 
the US made it, a positive effect emerges when a Republican offered this appeal in the US. 
However, this positive effect only reliably manifested on the thermometer item; upper middle 
class respondents did not report significantly higher vote intentions when the Republican 
candidate appealed to the working class (mean=0.48 [0.41, 0.56]) than when no appeal was made 
(mean=0.42 [0.34, 0.50]). Overall, Figure 1 shows that working class rhetoric had a positive 
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impact on candidate impressions among working class people, consistent with our Hypothesis 1, 
but had relatively little effect on people at the other end of the class hierarchy.  
Another way of thinking about the results in Figure 1 is that class appeals polarize 
support for the candidate along class lines, as we expected in Hypothesis 2. Figure 2 plots the 
predicted evaluation of the candidate for working and upper middle class respondents by 
treatment condition.10 There is little to no class polarization in evaluations in the baseline 
condition for left-wing parties in both countries and the difference in means between working 
and upper middle class respondents is statistically insignificant in both cases. However, in both 
countries, the candidate from the left-wing party clearly polarizes respondents along class lines 
when he appeals to the working class. The substantive positive growth in evaluations among 
working class respondents results in statistically significant differences in both cases with the 
resulting difference in difference (e.g. WC-UMCBaseline – WC-UMCWC Appeal) also statistically 
significant (USA: F = 11.80, p < 0.001; Denmark: F = 33.87, p < 0.001). There is more 
polarization between respondents in the baseline condition, on the other hand, when evaluating 
the candidate from the right-wing party: the upper middle class has a stronger preference for 
right-wing candidates than the working class does. The size and precision of this difference is 
larger in Denmark (UMC – WC = 0.14 [0.07, 0.21], p < 0.001) than the USA (0.07 [-0.01, 0.14], 
p < 0.10]. The direction of this polarization, however, reverses when a class appeal is present 
with working class respondents now reporting significantly more positive evaluations than upper 
class respondents. The size of this difference, meanwhile, is greater than in the baseline 
condition much as with the WC appeal condition comparisons above (USA: F = 8.69, p < 0.01; 
Denmark: F = 46.85, p < 0.001).  In other words, polarization increased. Figure 2 provides strong 
 
10 Table OA6 in Online Appendix A provides the interaction models that are the basis for the figures and F-tests.   
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support for our argument in Hypothesis 2 that class rhetoric leads to class polarization when it 
comes to candidate evaluations.  
 
Figure 2: Symbolic Working Class Appeals Polarize Respondents, Study 1 
 
Notes: Markers provide the predicted evaluation of the candidate among working and upper 
middle class respondents by treatment condition, with 95% confidence intervals. Interaction 
models can be found in Table OA6. 
 
Discussion 
Study 1 shows that candidates can successfully appeal to the working class in two 
different political contexts by targeting them in political communications. This in turn polarizes 
candidate evaluations between working and upper middle class respondents. In Study 2, we 
replicate and extend these findings in two ways. First, we measure vote intention rather than 
candidate evaluation. This is likely to be a harder test for the efficacy of class appeals. After all, 
one might evaluate a candidate positively due to a class appeal but have second thoughts about 
voting for the candidate. Second, and more importantly, the experiment in Study 2 is designed to 
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address the question of whether symbolic appeals are more or less effective than policy-centered 
appeals.  
Study 2: Symbolic Class Appeals Relative to Policy Appeals in Denmark 
Our second study was fielded in December 2017 using a Danish sample recruited via 
YouGov (n=1,506). In this study, respondents read two candidate vignettes, one about a Social 
Democratic candidate and the other about a Venstre candidate (the order of the vignettes was 
randomly varied). Respondents then indicated “how likely or unlikely” it was that “you would 
vote for a candidate like [Klaus Hansen/Dennis Williams]” on a 0-10 scale (higher = stronger 
intention to vote for the candidate; rescaled to range from 0-1 in the analyses below).11 
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of four conditions within each candidate 
vignette experiment. The first condition is a baseline where no information beyond the 
partisanship of the candidate is provided. The second condition includes a symbolic class appeal 
without substantive policy content. Here, the two candidates made party-stereotypical appeals, 
e.g. the Social Democratic candidate appealed to the working class while the Venstre candidate 
appealed to the upper middle class, using the same language as in Study 1. The third condition 
features the candidates advocating for a specific change in tax policy: the Social Democratic 
candidate advocates a tax cut on incomes less than 300,000 DKK and the Venstre candidate 
advocates a tax cut on incomes more than 500,000 DKK a year. We selected these amounts to 
roughly match the self-reported median income levels in the working and upper middle classes, 
respectively. Finally, the fourth condition featured the candidates combining the symbolic and 
policy appeal. We focus just on evaluations of the Social Democratic candidate in the following 
 




analyses. This enables us to ascertain whether the symbolic working class appeal from Study 1 
has a similar effect as a more explicit policy-based appeal speaking directly to the material 
interests of the working class; see Online Appendix B for analyses of the Venstre candidate 
experiment.  
Results 
Figure 3 plots the average difference in vote intentions between those in the treatment 
groups and the baseline; see Table OA7 in Online Appendix A for full model results. There are 
two key points to take from Figure 3. First, the findings here confirm much of what we found in 
Study 1 concerning the policy-less, symbolic class appeals. Working class respondents again 
report evaluations approximately 0.2 points higher on the 0-1 scale when they are given a 
symbolic appeal compared to when they are not. Conversely, upper middle class respondents are 
barely affected by the treatments. The result is once more increased polarization across class 
lines. For instance, while vote intentions for the Social Democratic candidate did not 
significantly differ between the two classes in the baseline condition (0.02 [-0.06, 0.09]; positive 
= WC > UMC), they substantially polarized in the symbolic appeal condition (0.24 [0.17, 0.32]; 
F = 17.3, p < 0.001; see Figure OA1 in Appendix A). This replicates one of the key findings 
from Study 1 with a separate Danish sample and a measure of vote intention rather than 









Figure 3: Symbolic Appeals are Interchangeable with Policy Appeals, Study 2 
 
Notes: Markers provide the difference in evaluations compared to the no class appeal baseline 
with 95% confidence intervals. See Tables OA7 for full model results.  
 
A second key result shown in Figure 3 concerns Hypotheses 3a and 3b about the relative 
impact of the policy-less and policy-centered appeals. Working class respondents reacted 
similarly to the symbolic and policy-centered appeals voiced by the Social Democratic candidate 
while upper middle class respondents did not react to any of the appeals. This suggests that 
candidates could plausibly use either type of appeal to the same effect particularly among 
working class voters. Interestingly, the fourth condition that combined the two appeals yielded 
similar effects on vote intentions as when the appeals were made separately. This may stem from 
the relatively large effect of both appeals among the working class. With effects of up to 0.2 
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points on the 0-1 scale we may have exhausted the potential for experimentally manipulating 
candidate evaluations particularly with the anchoring effect of partisanship present. This question 
notwithstanding, Study 2 shows that symbolic and policy appeals are similarly effective in 
influencing candidate vote intentions. We next discuss how the appeals work with a focus on 
whether working class respondents infer policy and/or group representational information from 
such appeals.  
Studies 1 and 2: Why Do Symbolic Appeals Work?  
Symbolic appeals to the working class substantially impacted candidate evaluations, and 
levels of class polarization in these evaluations, across three experiments in two different 
national contexts. We argued in Hypotheses 4 and 5 that such effects might derive from voters 
inferring two different, albeit non-exclusive, lessons from symbolic appeals. First, respondents 
might infer something about the policy views of the candidate (Hypothesis 4). To examine this 
possibility, we asked respondents on all three experiments to place the candidate on a 0-10 
economic ideology scale where lower values indicate more left-wing placements. If class appeals 
contain policy information, then we would expect to see candidates making a working class 
appeal rated as further to the left than the candidate in the party baseline.  
Figure 4 plots the marginal effect of the symbolic treatment from all three experiments 
from OLS models using a version of this measure scaled to range from 0-1. Overall, respondents 
tend to see the candidate appealing to the working class as significantly more left-wing than the 
baseline candidate. However, working class respondents do not appear to be driving this overall 
effect as their reactions were muted and inconsistent. In only one instance did the symbolic 




Figure 4: Symbolic Working Class Appeals Inconsistently Influence Ideological Placements, 
Studies 1 and 2  
 
Notes: Markers provide marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals on perceived candidate 
ideology. The top two subgraphs (Experiments 1 & 2) plot the marginal effect of the symbolic 
WC appeal separately by candidate partisanship. The bottom subgraph (Experiment 3) plots the 
effect for all three treatment groups. See Tables OA9-OA11 for full model results.  
 
when the Venstre candidate made a counter-stereotypical appeal in Experiment 1.12 This stands 
in contrast to the upper middle class respondents who, except in the case of the Democratic 
candidate in the US, react by consistently placing the candidate further to the left. Thus, while 
working class respondents consistently evaluated the candidate making a symbolic working class 
 
12 In Study 2, working class respondents did place the candidate significantly further left, but only when the policy 
appeal was also present.  
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appeal more positively, it does not appear that policy inferences were responsible for this 
effect.13 
In Hypothesis 5 we suggested an alternative possibility: that people would infer 
something about the representational posture of the politician, e.g. how the politician would 
interact with the group, even if they did not infer something about the policy particulars of that 
relationship. We asked respondents to indicate on a 0-10 scale how well each of five statements 
describes the candidate: that he cares about people like me, listens to people like me, respects 
people like me, does not care about people like me, and does not prioritize people like me. We 
use an index that averages the five items (rescaled: 0-1, αDenmark, Exp 1 = 0.85; αUS, Exp 2 = 0.93; 
αDenmark, Exp 3 = 0.81).  
Figure 5 corresponds to Figure 4 but focuses on these representational perceptions. 
Overall, the candidate symbolically appealing to the working class tends to be rated more 
positively on this measure. However, important differences emerge between the classes and in 
relation to the analyses provided in Figure 4. In accordance with Hypothesis 5, the symbolic 
appeal has a positive impact on this outcome in all cases among working class respondents. One 
way to understand the relative impact of the appeal on perceived ideology and representation is 
to consider the absolute value of the treatment’s effect averaged across all experiments. On  
 
13 There is another way in which policy could impinge on the evaluation process: priming. If the symbolic appeal 
activated policy-based reasoning then we would expect to see a greater impact of voters’ own economic ideology on 
subsequent evaluations than in the baseline condition. In Appendix C we find no evidence of this among working 
class respondents when using pre-test measures of ideological self-placement. There is limited evidence for priming 
if a four-item index of economic ideology questions is used as a predictor, specifically for working class Danish 
respondents exposed to the symbolic appeal. Overall, however, policy inferences seem unable to account for the 
major part of the effects shown in Figures 1-3. 
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Figure 5: Symbolic Working Class Appeals Influence Representation Attitudes, Study 1 and 2 
Notes: Markers provide marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals on perceived candidate 
representation. The top two subgraphs (Experiments 1 & 2) plot the marginal effect of the 
symbolic WC appeal separately by candidate partisanship. The bottom subgraph (Experiment 3) 
plots the effect for all three treatment groups. See Tables OA12-OA14 for full model results.  
 
average, working class respondents who received the symbolic appeal reported attitudes on the 
representational measure nearly 0.2 points higher on the 0-1 scale than did those in the baseline. 
This is almost three times the average effect on ideological placements (0.07). Working class 
respondents thus consistently believed that the politician making a working class appeal – albeit 
symbolically and without explicit policy content – would listen to, respect, prioritize, and care 
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about them, but did not seem to necessarily infer much about what this would entail policy-
wise.14  
Conclusion 
While the relationship between social class and voting behavior has weakened in many 
countries, some politicians continue to make symbolic appeals to the working class in campaign 
communications. Do voters respond to class-based campaigning and, if so, with what strength 
and how? Across three experiments, in two different countries, our evidence suggests three 
important conclusions. First, in accordance with Hypothesis 1, we see clear evidence that 
symbolic appeals to the working class lead to greater overall support from working class voters. 
And since upper middle class respondents’ reactions are negative or zero, we find, as Hypothesis 
2 suggested, that the presence of working class appeals polarizes candidate support along class 
lines. Second, we show that policy-centered appeals are no more, but also no less, effective than 
symbolic appeals. Neither Hypothesis 3a nor 3b is supported as it turns out that both types of 
appeals work equally effectively as campaign tools. Third, while a working class appeal allows 
people to infer something about the ideology of a candidate (Hypothesis 4), these inferences are 
inconsistent in magnitude and importance among the group driving the effects on candidate 
 
14 Upper middle class respondents, meanwhile, reacted considerably less on the representational scale. Only among 
Danish respondents in Experiment 1 did we see minor, negative scores as would have been expected given the working 
class appeal from the candidate. The results from Study 2 in Figures 4 and 5 also imply that working class respondents 
in that study did not simply substitute symbolic appeals for policy appeals. We see a different reaction to the two types 
of appeals most clearly with respect to ideological reasoning. Here, working class respondents only change their 
perception of the candidate’s policy position when the policy appeal is present. By contrast, perceptions of the 
candidate’s representational stance appear more strongly influenced when the symbolic appeal is present than when it 
is not. These differences are, however, rather modest. 
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evaluations, i.e. the working class. Class appeals seem to matter more for what they potentially 
say about the candidate’s representational priorities (Hypothesis 5). Here, perceptions among 
working class voters consistently responded to the nature of the candidate’s class rhetoric.  
Our results have an immediate implication for the literature on class politics and, 
particularly, for the ongoing debate concerning the role of social class in voting behavior. The 
past three decades have seen a recurring debate over whether class voting is dead, in hibernation, 
or alive but only in some electoral contexts (Bartels, 2016; Brooks, Nieuwbeerta, & Manza, 
2006; Clark et al., 1993; Elff, 2007; Evans & Tilley, 2017; Franklin, 1992; Heath, 2015, 2018; 
Kingston, 2000; Kriesi, 1998). Social class did not structure evaluations of candidates from left-
wing parties in the baseline conditions in our survey experiments, but class rhetoric reinvigorated 
class divisions. It may be that class voting is in hibernation in some contexts, but ready to be 
activated if political elites started talking more about class. Our experiments thus provide new, 
and causally persuasive, evidence in favor of a top-down perspective on class voting: the 
relationship between social class cleavages and voting behavior varies according to elite 
behavior signaling the relevance of these cleavages (Evans, 2000; Evans & Tilley, 2017; 
Przeworski & Sprague, 1986; Thau, n.d.). Moreover, and following up on work by Oliver Heath 
(2015; 2018), our results show that working class voters react more strongly to symbolic 
representation than policy (or substantive) representation. This is an important nuance to Heath’s 
finding that working class voters react to descriptive representation (i.e. they prefer working 
class candidates) as it is much easier for candidates to change their symbolic group appeals than 
their class background. Overall, we help to substantiate the idea, recently highlighted again by 
Achen and Bartels (2016), that electoral choice follows from group-based reasoning. However, 
our results also suggest that group-centrism is not constant, but varies depending on elite cues. 
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Our results create something of a paradox. Working class appeals were a politically 
sound strategy for the candidates in our studies, as they attracted working class voters and had 
little backlash effect on upper-middle class voters. But even though leftist parties and candidates 
continue to use class appeals, they target classes less than previously (Thau, 2019). Why has this 
type of elite rhetoric been toned down over the last few decades? One answer is that given 
limited media coverage, and scarce attention from voters, parties can only appeal to so many 
groups. Faced with a shrinking working class, leftist parties choose to appeal across class 
boundaries or focus on other cleavage groups altogether (Best, 2011). However, this calculation 
may have been misguided, since the working class still makes up a sizable fraction of the 
electorate and working class appeals do not repel middle class voters, at least not currently. 
Appealing to the working class could thus be less of an electoral albatross than some politicians 
and party consultants might have thought. 
One important line of future research concerns who can offer what type of class appeal. 
We showed that both left- and right-wing candidates can profit electorally, but recent work on 
group appeals suggest that these may be most effective when offered by a fellow group member 
given the increased credibility of the message (Holman et al., 2015). If working class appeals can 
only be used by working class candidates, then they are hardly universally applicable. After all, 
most parties in most countries have almost no legislators who previously held working class jobs 
(Carnes, 2016; Carnes & Lupu, 2015; Heath, 2015; O’Grady, 2019). We left the class 
background of the candidate unstated. However, a survey conducted in February 2018 with 109 
MTurk respondents provides some indirect insight. Respondents on the survey were randomly 
assigned to read either the working class or the upper middle class vignette without the 
partisanship of the candidate. We asked respondents to place the candidate on the same social 
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class measure used in the main studies. Approximately 91 per cent of respondents in the upper 
middle class appeal condition indicated that this candidate would likely be in either the upper 
middle or upper class. Respondents who read the working class appeal instead were far more 
torn in their class categorizations. While the modal response was working class, only 27 per cent 
of respondents selected this option. Indeed, nearly as many respondents placed the candidate in 
the lower middle class (22 per cent), the middle class (22 per cent), or the upper middle class (18 
per cent). This suggests that candidates from a broad array of backgrounds may be able to use 
working class appeals effectively. 
Future work might also explore another question raised by our results. The class appeal 
treatments used in our experiments always contained a contrast between two classes, i.e. an 
acknowledgement of one class alongside a repudiation of the other. This means that our class 
appeals were conflictual by construction. A more one-sided appeal may be somewhat weaker 
since it does not directly present a class conflict. Yet, given recent findings of continuing 
awareness of class and class conflict in modern societies (Hout, 2008; Piston, 2018; Rhodes & 
Johnson, 2017; Robison & Stubager, 2018), it may be that an appeal to one class is enough to 
produce the effects we observe. 
Although our focus has mainly been on the working class, our results also pose a puzzle 
concerning the upper middle class. While the working class was attracted by working class 
appeals, the upper middle class was largely unaffected. Moreover, while the working class was 
alienated by upper middle class appeals, upper middle class respondents were again largely 
unaffected. We believe there are a few potential explanations for these asymmetric reactions that 
future work could address. First, the working class has historically had a special role in politics 
in many countries as seen in the frequent invocation of this group in party and candidate appeals 
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(Evans & Tilley, 2017; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Przeworski & Sprague, 1986; Rhodes & 
Johnson, 2017). It may be that upper middle class individuals simply see appeals to the working 
class as part of the background of politics even if they discount their actual relevance due to the 
upper-class favoritism in policymaking (O’Grady, 2019; Schlozman, Verba, & Brady, 2017). 
Second, it is possible that members of the working class have a stronger sense of linked fate due 
to a lack of resources and power relative to other class groups. Working class respondents may 
therefore be particularly likely to consider this identity as relevant for their political behavior, 
leading to differential responsiveness to symbolic group appeals across class groups (Huddy, 
2013). Third, sympathy for the working class among upper middle class individuals may be a 
complementary factor as we discuss in Appendix E using evidence from a supplementary survey. 
The mean working class sympathy score for the upper middle class is 7.2 among those who 
identify with the upper middle class compared to an overall mean of 7.6. This high level of 
working class sympathy might explain the lack of negative reactions to the working class appeals 
among upper middle class respondents (thereby underlining our point above that such appeals 
have broad resonance in the electorate; see also Piston, 2018). Our data cannot delineate which 
explanation is more likely, nor properly take apart the relationship between class identity and 
class sympathy, but this is surely a question worth addressing in future research. 
Finally, our results also speak to the broader literature on candidate group appeals and 
candidate strategy, where the focus has been largely on other social cleavages such as gender, 
race/ethnicity, and religion (Hersh & Schaffner, 2013; Holman et al., 2015; Kam et al., 2017; 
Philpot, 2004). We find that class appeals seem to work as effectively as other group appeals. A 
key question for future attention, however, is how the specific group matters for the efficacy of 
group-based campaigning. The groups studied in the existing literature for the most part maintain 
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rigid boundaries between in- and out-group members. Perhaps not surprisingly, appeals to these 
types of groups sometimes lead to backlash effects (Hersh & Schaffner, 2013; but see: Holman et 
al., 2015; Kam et al., 2017). But class-based identities, like national identities, are potentially 
more akin to supra-identities that envelop other cleavages. Here, the boundaries of inclusion may 
be more porous. This means that the ability of political elites to structure political conflict along 
group lines (Achen & Bartels, 2016; Huddy, 2013), as well as the effectiveness of group-based 
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Online Appendix A 
Table OA1: Descriptive Statistics, Danish Studies 
 Study 1 Study 2 
Age   
Avg. Age 47.56 (14.06) 49.40 [14.50] 
%18-34 19.39 17.66 
%35-49 34.96 31.74 
%50-64 32.50 33.20 
%65-70 13.15 17.40 
Gender (%)   
Female 51.98 50.53 
Education (%)   
Grund/folkeskole 10.83 13.94 
Almengymnasial uddannelse 9.67 6.37 
Erhvervsgymnasial uddannelse 5.51 3.12 
Erhvervsfaglig uddannelse 27.90 35.52 
Kort videregående uddannelse 





Lang videregående uddannelse 5 
år eller 
14.12 12.62 
Forskeruddannelse (f.eks. PHD) 0.44 0.80 
Income   
Median Household 500,000 – 599,999 DKK 400,000-499,999 DKK 
   
Region (%)   
Hovedstaden 30.32 30.08 
Sjælland 14.56 14.01 
Syddanmark 21.37 23.24 
Midtjylland 23.11 21.65 
Nordjylland 10.64 11.02 
   
Mean Ideology 5.14 (2.44) 5.22 (2.53) 
   
Social Class   
Lower Class 4.06 5.56 
Working Class 17.07 21.19 
Lower Middle Class 15.91 18.75 
Middle Class 30.75 20.81 
Upper Middle Class 27.37 27.06 
Upper Class 0.87 0.75 
Don’t Know 3.97 5.88 







Table OA2: Descriptive Statistics, US Study 
 T1: Everybody T2: Everybody 
Party Identification   
Mean 3.44 (2.01) 3.43 (2.03) 
% Democrat 55.09% 55.18% 
% Independent 15.32% 15.31% 
% Republican 29.59% 29.51% 
   
Ideological Self-Placement (0-
10; high = extremely 
conservative) 
  
Mean General 4.26 (2.77) 4.29 (2.82) 
Mean Economic 4.79 (2.92) 4.78 (2.97) 
Mean Social  3.70 (3.21) 3.78 (3.25) 
   
Gender: % Female 56.44% 55.60% 
Race/Ethnicity:   
% White 73.89% 73.06% 
% Black 8.45% 8.68% 
% Hispanic 7.72% 8.52% 
% Asian 7.62% 7.24% 
% Other 2.1% 2.50% 
   
Age:    
Mean 38.94 (12.27) 39.07 (12.25) 
% 18-29 24.79% 23.89% 
% 30-44 46.20% 46.50% 
% 45-65 24.60% 25.21% 
% 65+ 4.41% 4.41% 
   
Household Income   
Median Category %50,000 – 59,999 $40,000-49,999 
   
Education   
% HS or Less 9.25%  9.98% 
% Some College 35.25%  35.99% 
% Bachelor’s Degree 39.19% 38.00% 
% Post-Bachelor’s Degree 16.32% 16.03% 
   
Social Class (%)   
Lower Class 5.64 7.27 
Working Class 21.94 29.88 
LMC 19.73 18.21 
MC 39.82 26.91 
UMC 12.34 16.93 







Table OA3: Feeling Thermometer Analyses for Figure 1 (Denmark) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 








































Observations 1011 227 284 1014 210 300 
Adjusted R2 0.111 0.390 0.002 0.123 0.410 0.005 
SD = Social Democratic candidate; Venstre = Venstre candidate. All = All respondents, WC = 
Working Class respondents, UMC = Upper Middle Class Respondents.; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
 
Table OA4. Feeling Thermometer Analyses for Figure 1 (USA) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Rep:All Rep:WC Rep:UMC Dem:All Dem:WC Dem:UMC 












       

























Observations 935 343 169 947 355 165 
Adjusted R2 0.342 0.475 0.181 0.333 0.444 0.118 
Dem=Democratic candidate; Rep=Republican. All = All respondents, WC = Working Class 
respondents, UMC = Upper Middle Class Respondents.; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table OA5. Vote Intention Analyses (USA) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Rep:All Rep:WC Rep:UMC Dem:All Dem:WC Dem:UMC 












       



























Observations 935 343 169 947 355 165 
Adjusted R2 0.195 0.334 0.053 0.253 0.370 0.077 
Dem=Democratic candidate; Rep=Republican. All = All respondents, WC = Working Class 






Table OA6: Class Polarization Models, Figure 2 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Venstre Social Dem. Republican Democrat 
Class Appeal:     
     








     








     
Social Class:     



























     
Interactions:     
     










     








     








     










     








     

















Observations 987 999 935 947 
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Adjusted R2 0.206 0.230 0.356 0.350 
Notes: Base category for social class is the upper middle class. Models 1 and 2 are from 
Experiment 1 (Denmark), Models 3 & 4 are from Experiment 2 (USA).  Standard errors in 







Figure OA1: Class Polarization, Study 1 
 
Notes: Markers provide the difference between working and upper middle class respondents 
based on the models in Table OA6. Positive values indicate more positive evaluations among 
working class than upper middle class respondents; empty circles indicate that the difference is 
not statistically different from 0 at a p < 0.05 standard. F statistics stem from Wald tests that 
indicate whether the two coefficients are equivalent (i.e. WC-UMC in No Class Appeal = WC-
UMC in WC Class Appeal).  
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Table OA7: Study 2: Vote Intention (Figure 3) and Feeling Thermometer Models, SD Candidate 
Experiment 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 



























































Observations 1506 428 445 1506 428 445 
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.048 -0.004 0.044 0.091 0.002 
Notes: Vote = Vote Intention, Therm = Thermometer; Standard errors in parentheses 




Table OA8: Study 2: Class Polarization Models, SD Candidate Experiment 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Vote Intention Thermometer 
Class Treatment:   
   









   




   
Social Class:   















   
Interactions:   
   




   




   




   




   




   




   




   




   









Observations 1506 1506 
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.097 







Figure OA2: Class Polarization in Study 2, Social Democratic Candidate Experiment 
 
Notes: Markers provide the difference in candidate vote intentions between Working Class and 
Upper-Middle Class respondents based on treatment assignment. Positive values indicate that the 
working class had more positive vote intentions than did the upper middle class. Marker shape 
indicates whether the difference between the classes is significantly different from 0.  
Table OA9. Ideological Placements (Higher = More Conservative; Exp 1, Denmark) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 







































Observations 1011 227 284 1014 210 300 
Adjusted R2 0.192 0.114 0.415 0.188 0.044 0.317 
SD = Social Democratic candidate; Venstre = Venstre candidate. All = All respondents, WC = 
Working Class respondents, UMC = Upper Middle Class Respondents.; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
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Table OA10. Ideological Placements (Higher = More Conservative; Exp 2, USA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Rep:All Rep:WC Rep:UMC Dem:All Dem:WC Dem:UMC 












       

























Observations 934 343 169 946 354 165 
Adjusted R2 0.061 0.020 0.134 0.110 0.098 0.069 
Dem=Democratic candidate; Rep=Republican. All = All respondents, WC = Working Class 
respondents, UMC = Upper Middle Class Respondents. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table OA11: Ideological Placements (Higher = More Conservative; Exp 3, Denmark (SD 
Candidate) 
 (1) (2) (3) 














    













Observations 1506 428 445 
Adjusted R2 0.025 0.012 0.052 
All: All respondents. WC = working class respondents. UMC = upper middle class respondents. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table OA12. Representation Placements (Exp 1, Denmark) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 









































Observations 1011 227 284 1014 210 300 
Adjusted R2 0.030 0.248 0.103 0.033 0.297 0.173 
SD = Social Democratic candidate; Venstre = Venstre candidate. All = All respondents, WC = 
Working Class respondents, UMC = Upper Middle Class Respondents.; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 




Table OA13. Representation Placements (Exp 2, USA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Rep:All Rep:WC Rep:UMC Dem:All Dem:WC Dem:UMC 












       

























Observations 936 344 169 946 355 165 
Adjusted R2 0.254 0.449 0.009 0.247 0.456 0.001 
Dem=Democratic candidate; Rep=Republican. All = All respondents, WC = Working Class 
respondents, UMC = Upper Middle Class Respondents.; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table OA14: Representation Placements (Exp 3., Denmark) 
 (1) (2) (3) 




























Observations 1506 428 445 
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.049 0.008 
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All: All respondents. WC = working class respondents. UMC = upper middle class respondents. 





Reactions of the Lower Middle and Middle Class 
 
In the main text we focus on working and upper middle class respondents. How did the lower 
middle and middle class react? Table OA15 provides means for these respondents across the 
studies. Figures OA3 and OA4, meanwhile, provide replications of Figures 1 and 3 from in-text 
but now with the lower middle and middle classes included. As Figure OA3 shows, the working 
class appeals also led to significantly more positive evaluations for these respondents. The size 
of the effects are sometimes weaker as might be expected, but still in the same direction. Figure 
OA4 again shows that the lower middle class reacted positively to the WC appeal with 
evaluations significantly more positive in the Symbolic Group Appeal condition than the 
Baseline. Middle class respondents also reacted positively on average, although the coefficient 
for the WC group appeal is not statistically significant. That being said, there is certainly no 
evidence that middle class respondents react negatively to working class appeals.  
 
 
Table OA15: Lower-Middle and Middle Class Candidate Evaluations 
 Study 1: Denmark 
 SD Venstre 
 Baseline WC Appeal Baseline WC Appeal 
Lower Middle 
Class 
4.61 [4.15,5.08] 6.60 [6.04, 7.16] 3.90 [3.42,4.39] 6.14 [5.44,6.86] 
Middle Class 4.84 [4.53, 5.16] 5.79 [5.42, 6.16] 4.42 [4.04, 4.80] 5.81 [5.40,6.23] 
 Study 1:USA (Thermometer) 
 Democrat Republican 
 Baseline WC Appeal Baseline WC Appeal 
Lower Middle 
Class 
5.49 [5.01, 5.98] 6.75 [6.18, 7.32] 4.56 [3.96, 5.16] 6.17 [5.58, 6.77] 
Middle Class 5.48 [4.98, 5.97] 6.79 [6.40, 7.18] 4.68 [4.11, 5.25] 6.23 [5.79, 6.67] 
 Study 1:USA (Vote Intention) 
 Democrat Republican 
 Baseline WC Appeal Baseline WC Appeal 
Lower Middle 
Class 
5.45 [4.80, 6.10] 6.29 [5.50, 7.09] 3.81 [3.07, 4.54] 4.79 [3.97, 5.60] 
Middle Class 5.29 [4.64, 5.93] 6.51 [6.00, 7.02] 4.01 [3.36, 4.66] 5.09 [453, 5.66] 
 Study 2: Denmark (Thermometer) 
 Baseline Group Appeal Policy Appeal Group + Policy 
Lower Middle 
Class 
5.07 [ 4.66, 5.49] 6.52 [6.13, 6.91] 6.87 [6.32, 7.42] 6.84 [6.29, 7.40] 
Middle Class 5.23 [4.90, 5.56] 5.84 [5.35, 6.33] 6.27 [5.73, 6.81] 6.29 [5.84, 6.73] 
 Study 2: Denmark (Vote Intention) 
 Baseline Group Appeal Policy Appeal Group + Policy 
Lower Middle 
Class 
3.83 [3.26, 4.39] 5.11 [4.54, 5.68] 5.49 [4.89, 6.09] 5.73 [5.15, 6.32] 
Middle Class 3.81 [3.23, 4.39] 4.53 [3.90, 5.16] 4.86 [4.26, 5.46] 4.57 [4.00, 5.15] 
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Notes: Cell proves the mean thermometer (or vote intention for Study 2) scores by condition for 
respondents in the Lower Middle and Middle Class. 95% confidence intervals are provided in the 
brackets. Study 2 data is from the Social Democrats working class experiment. Responses are on 






Figure OA3: Working Class Appeal Effects for All Class Groups, Study 1  
 
 







Online Appendix B: UMC Class Appeals 
 
In Study 1 we also included conditions where the candidate appealed to the upper-middle class. 
This type of appeal was simply the inverse of the WC appeal in terms of wording but with two 
other types of worker mentioned (Denmark: engineers and high school teachers; US: engineers 
and pharmacists).15 The models reported in Online Appendix A include this treatment while 
Figure OB1 provides an overview of the marginal effect of the WC appeal for all respondents, 
working class respondents, and upper-middle class respondents for the feeling thermometer item. 
The results here are broadly the inverse of the WC appeal conditions. Working class respondents 
were turned off by such appeals, becoming substantially less warm toward the candidate in 
question. UMC respondents were either unaffected (Denmark) or negatively impacted (the US), 
which is the same as what happened with the WC appeal or its inverse (e.g. the US). The result 
was likewise greater polarization; the difference between WC and UMC respondents in 
candidate evaluations was significantly greater in Denmark (SD: F=24.17, p < 0.001; Venstre: 
F=9.14, p < 0.01) and for the Democratic candidate in the US (F=3.97, p = 0.05; Republican: 
F=1.07, p =0.30).  
 
In Study 2, respondents read about a Venstre candidate that could appeal to the upper-middle 
class symbolically and/or in combination with a policy oriented appeal (e.g. a tax cut for higher 
earners). Figure OB2 provides the marginal effect of the treatments on candidate vote intentions. 
All three treatments had negative effects on the vote intentions of working class respondents, 
although only in the Symbolic Appeal condition was it significant.  That being said, polarization 
between the classes tended to increase in the two symbolic appeal conditions, but not in the 
policy condition (relative to the baseline): Symbolic vs. Baseline: F=4.21, p < 0.05; Policy vs. 
Baseline: F=0.11, p = 0.74;  Symbolic Policy: F=6.69, p < 0.01.  
 
15 We also pre-tested evaluations of these workers. Noticeably, ratings for the workers were positive (US: 
engineers = 7.5, pharmacists = 7.2; Denmark: engineers = 7.3, high school teachers = 7.1) and, indeed, more 
positive than were ratings of the upper middle class itself (USA: 6.5; Denmark: 6.6). This difference in ratings 
between the class and workers suggests that the effects of the upper middle class treatment are conservative 
estimates insofar as these positively evaluated workers were undermining the negative impact of the class appeal.  
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Online Appendix C: Ideological Priming 
 
In the text we considered whether the treatments influenced respondents’ perceptions of the 
ideology of the candidate making the class appeal. We also have measures of pre-test economic 
ideology (0-10, higher = more conservative; scaled 0-1 in analyses below) for respondents, 
which enables us to explore whether the class appeal primed ideological thinking.  
We predicted the candidate evaluation items (Study 1: thermometer; Study 2: vote intention) 
based on appeal treatment, party treatment (in Study 1), ideology, and the full set of interactions 
for these variables. Figure OC1 plots the marginal effect of ideology according to treatment 
status. We should see a positive coefficient for ideology in evaluations of the Venstre/Republican 
candidates and a negative one for the (Social) Democratic candidates. If priming occurs, 
meanwhile, these effects should become significantly stronger in that direction. However, we 
broadly fail to find this, particularly among working class respondents. Note that the coefficients 
for working class respondents in Figure OC1 generally all overlap with one another and differ in 
only trivial ways in magnitude. A Wald test comparing the coefficient for ideology among 
working class respondents in Denmark is insignificant in both cases.16 Among working class 
respondents in the US, meanwhile, Wald tests are either significant (Democrat: F = 7.68, p < 
0.01) or nearly so (Republican: F = 3.17, p < 0.10), but in both cases the effect of ideology is 
weakened (e.g. closer to 0) rather than strengthened (further from zero and in the appropriate 
direction). Among working class respondents, meanwhile, conservative respondents report more 
positive impressions than liberal/left-wing respondents in the Baseline condition in both 
countries. The working class appeal from the right-wing candidate, meanwhile, tends to reverse 
this relationship, with conservatives now less (Venstre; F = 57.4, p < 0.001) or as (USA; F 
=10.60, p < 0.01) supportive. 
Figure OC2 focuses on Experiment 3 and specifically the Social Democratic candidate making a 
symbolic appeal to the working class. Again, we expect to see a negative coefficient in the 
Baseline that should become more negative if priming occurred. Among all respondents there is 
this negative shift (from 0.23 to 0.34), but not among working class respondents where the 
coefficient again shifts towards zero (from -0.13 to -0.05), although a Wald test comparing the 
baseline and symbolic appeal coefficients is insignificant (F = 0.25, p = 0.63). On the other hand, 
upper middle class respondents show much stronger connections between their ideological self-
placement and subsequent candidate impressions in the Baseline, although the treatments do not 
appear to appreciably impact this relationship.   
Figures OC1 and OC2 thus provide little evidence that the symbolic appeal led respondents, and 
particularly working class respondents, to align their candidate impressions more strongly with 
their ideological priors.  
The analyses in Figures OC1 and OC2 focus on respondents’ self-reported left/right ideology. 
We also possess an additional pre-test measure on all surveys of respondents’ economic 
ideology. Specifically, we asked respondents how much they agreed or disagreed with four 
 
16 Venstre candidate: F = 1.17, p = 0.28; Social Democrat: F = 0.31, p = 0.58.  
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statements: (1) incomes should be more equal as all citizens have the same needs for food and 
housing; (2) some degree of economic inequality is necessary for a dynamic and prosperous 
society; (3) incomes should be made more equal as people have different abilities; and taxes on 
the wealthy should be lowered. These measures tap a central element of the left/right ideological 
divide: whether the government should take a more active role in the economic lives of its 
citizens. In Figures OC3 and OC4 we replicate the foregoing priming analyses but with an index 
taken from the average of the four items (alphas: Experiment 1 = 0.83, Experiment 2 = 0.76, 
Experiment 3 = 0.82).17 
The economic attitudes index is also scaled so that higher values indicate more conservative or 
right leanings. We would thus expect negative coefficients for left-wing candidates in the 
baseline (no appeal) condition and positive coefficients for right-wing candidates with these 
coefficients shifting further in these directions if priming is occurring. There is somewhat clearer 
evidence of this type of priming relationship in Figure OC3 than in Figure OC1, but mostly for 
Danish working class respondents. Beginning with these respondents, the economic attitudes 
measure is unrelated to candidate impressions in the baseline version of the Social Democratic 
candidate but shifts markedly leftward when the symbolic working class appeal is present (F = 
13.85, p < 0.001). Economic attitudes matter more in the baseline condition when the candidate 
is from Venstre, but they likewise shift significantly to the left when the candidate appeals to the 
working class (F = 16.05, p < 0.001). Results are more inconsistent in the United States, 
however. There is a clear division in attitudes based on economic attitudes among those assigned 
to learn about the Democratic candidate that offers no appeal with the presence of a symbolic 
working class appeal changing this little (F = 0.87, p = 0.35). However, we do see a significant 
shift from a positive coefficient to a positive but null coefficient when the candidate is a 
Republican (F = 7.68, p < 0.01). In other words, the symbolic appeal did not lead working class 
respondents in this case to further polarize based on their prior attitudes on this measure. Among 
upper middle class respondents, the relationships do not change from Figure OC1. 
Figure OC4, meanwhile, focuses on Experiment 3. Much as in Experiment 1 in Denmark, the 
economic attitudes measure is unrelated to working class respondent’s vote intentions toward the 
Social Democratic candidate in the Baseline. However, a significant negative coefficient does 
emerge in both conditions where a working class appeal (but not a policy based appeal) is 
present (Symbolic Alone: F = 9.02, p < 0.01; Symbolic + Policy: F = 4.52, p < 0.05). These latter 
results thus suggest that the symbolic appeal may have triggered more positive impressions for 
policy related reasons not being captured by the ideological left/right self-identification scale 
among Danish working class respondents. Again, the pattern is virtually unchanged from Figure 
OC2 among upper middle class respondents. At the same time, the policy appeal did not 
influence the relationship between this measure of economic attitudes and post-test voting 
intentions.  
While the results for the Danish working class respondents on the economic attitude index add 
some amount of variation to the picture, the overall message emanating from the analysis of 
ideological priming is that just as is the case for the direct ideological inferences investigated in 
 
17 Left/right self-placement and the index are correlated at approximately 0.6.  
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the main manuscript, priming seems unable to explain the major part of the effects of the class 




Figure OC1: Ideological Priming, Experiments 1 & 2 
 
Notes: Circles represent the effect of ideology on candidate evaluations in the No Class Appeal 
baseline. Black triangles provide the effect in the Working Class Appeal condition, while black 
squares provide it for the Upper Middle Class appeal condition.   
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Figure OC2: Ideological Priming, Experiment 3 (Denmark) 
 






Figure OC3: Priming Economic Attitudes, Experiments 1 & 2 
 
Notes: Markers provide the effect of the four-item economic values index. The index ranges 





Figure OC4: Priming the Economic Index, Experiment 3 
 
Notes: Markers provide the effect of the four-item economic values index. The index ranges 





Online Appendix D: Working & Lower Class Vs Just Working Class 
 
In the text we merge lower- and working-class respondents into one category for analyses. What 
are the consequences of this choice? The figures below investigate this question by plotting the 
mean value on the dependent variable in question for ‘working class’ respondents with two 
markers presented: (1) a circle representing our in-text analyses and (2) a triangle wherein the 
‘working class’ category excluded respondents that identified with the lower class. [Responses 
are on their original 0-10 scale, rather than the 0-1 scale we use in text.] As these Figures show, 
this measurement choice has little influence on our results.  
 

















Online Appendix OE 
In the analyses in-text we rely on a subjective measure of class identification to investigate the 
influence of working class appeals by social class. One question that may arise is whether our 
results are robust to alternative operationalizations of class. Here we investigate two other 
objective indicators of class: income and occupation.  
Income as Moderator 
We have data on respondent income in all studies. In all samples we asked respondents to 
indicate their household income. We refit our moderation models by regressing candidate 
evaluations on treatment assignment, income, and their interaction. Figures OE1 and OE2 plot 
the marginal effect of the working class treatments by each level of income for Study 1 (OE1) 
and Study 2 (OE2) separately. The Figures demonstrate a negatively sloped interaction with the 
working class appeal substantially improving evaluations of the candidate among those with low 
reported income and a decreasing effect as income increases.  
A potential concern might be that household income does not neatly map onto social class as 
well as personal income. We did not measure personal income in the US survey, but did do so in 
both Danish studies. In practice, this decision is not consequential. The two measures are 
correlated at approximately 0.76 in both surveys. Meanwhile, we see the same patterns with 
personal income as we do with household income as seen in Figure OE3.  
Occupation as Moderator 
We also explore an alternative measurement for class using the data from Study 1 in Denmark: 
occupation or objective class. In keeping with the majority of studies in the literature, we 
operationalize objective class using the so-called EGP class schema. In the analyses, we have, 
however, simplified the schema to five categories: manuals, routine non-manuals, lower and 
higher controllers as well as the self-employed. Figure OE4 provides a first glimpse of the results 
by plotting the mean evaluations of the candidate making either no appeal or a working class 
appeal for manuals (i.e., objective working class) and higher controllers (i.e., objective upper 
middle class). The working class appeal did not turn off the higher controllers. On the other 
hand, the working class appeal led to substantially more positive evaluations among manual 
laborers regardless of party.  
As a second step we regress candidate evaluations on respondent objective class, treatment 
assignment, and their interactions; see Table OE4 at the end of this appendix. Figure OE5 plots 
the marginal effect of the working class appeal by objective class, which again shows the 
positive and substantive effect of the working class appeal among manual laborers and the lack 
of backlash from other class groups.  
This all suggests that our results in-text are not the result of some idiosyncrasy with the 
subjective measure – indeed we are find almost identical patterns of results also when using 
objective class measures. 
Class Affect as Moderator 
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A second type of alternative moderator is class affect. Thus, the results may also be driven by 
respondents’ sympathy for the classes involved rather than (or in addition to) their class 
identification (as examined in-text) or objective class position (as examined above). To 
investigate this possibility, we leveraged data from the Danish part of the supplementary study 
mentioned in footnote 7 of the main text. In that study, we asked respondents (pre-treatment) to 
evaluate the working and upper middle classes on 0-10 scales (higher = more positive 
evaluations). Since the study was not initially intended to test the moderating influence of class 
affect, we restricted the experiment to only include the four treatment conditions – i.e., Social 
Democrat/working class appeal; Social Democrat/upper middle class appeal; Venstre/working 
class appeal; Venstre/upper middle class appeal – thereby excluding the no-appeal, control 
conditions. While this is unfortunate for the current purpose, we can still get a sense of any 
moderating effect of class affect by comparing the relationships between sympathy for the 
working and upper middle classes and candidate sympathy across the four treatments. In Figure 
OE6 we show the predicted values of candidate sympathy from models regressing this measure 
on sympathy for either the working or upper middle class, the four treatments as well as their 
interaction. The regression coefficients appear in Table OE5 (Models 1 & 2). 
As can be seen, the relationships are, with one exception, as would be expected. Thus, among 
respondents who received treatments in which the candidate appealed to the working class, we 
see a positive relationship between sympathy for that class and for the candidate. Among 
respondents who received treatments containing an appeal to the upper middle class, we see a 
negative relationship between working class and candidate sympathy. For upper middle class 
sympathy, we see the reverse pattern except in the condition where the Venstre candidate makes 
a working class appeal where the relationship between upper middle class and candidate 
sympathy is positive. One possible explanation for this result is that respondents high in upper 
middle class sympathy may applaud the candidate’s attempt to attract a wider group of voters, 
believing that this might eventually increase the likelihood of passing traditional, right-wing 
Venstre-policies. This remains speculation, however.  
The results are robust to the inclusion of both class affect measures (and their interaction with the 
treatments; results not shown) in the model at the same time although in that model the 
relationship between either class affect measure and candidate sympathy is insignificant in the 
Venstre/working class condition – potentially reflecting the countervailing forces alluded to 
above. We have not pursued these points further however, since the data set only contains about 
500 respondents, thereby making inferences uncertain in more complicated models. 
Because the study was not designed for this purpose, we only asked for respondents’ class 
identification post-treatment and so we cannot rely on responses to this question being unbiased 
by the treatments. With this caveat, it should be noted that if we include the variable (and its 
interaction with the treatments) as a control in the models, we get results very close to those 
presented in Figure OE6. Notably, as is evident from Figure OE7 this also applies the other way 
around meaning that the differences across class identification reported in-text and in section OB 
above are left almost unchanged by the inclusion of the class affect measures in the model. (See 
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Table OE5, Models 3 and 4 for underlying model results). Thus, the results in-text do not appear 





Figure OE1: Household Income Moderation, Study 1 
 
Notes: Markers provide the marginal effect of the symbolic working class appeal by level of 
household income (x-axis) with 95% confidence intervals. Separate lines are provided for the 
party of the politician.  
Figure OE2: Household Income Moderation, Study 2
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Notes: Markers provide the marginal effect of a the symbolic working class appeal by level of 
household income (x-axis) with 95% confidence intervals. Separate lines are provided for the 
party of the politician.  
Figure OE3: Moderation Analyses Using Personal Income (Denmark Only) 
 
Figure OE4: Mean Candidate Evaluations for Higher Controllers and Manual Laborers, Study 1 
(Denmark) 
 
Notes: Markers provide mean candidate evaluations for manual laborers and higher controllers 






Figure OE5: Marginal Effect of Working Class Appeal by Occupation (Study 1, Denmark) 
 
Notes: Markers provide the average marginal effect of the working class appeal by party 
treatment separately for the different objective classes. Results are based on Model 3 in Table 
OE4 below.  
 
Figure OE6: Candidate Evaluations Based on Class Affect and Candidate Information 
 
Note: Markers provide predicted candidate evaluations with 95% confidence intervals. Separate 
lines are provided for the different combination of candidate characteristics (party and group 
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appeal). The x-axis is the respondent’s affect toward the class. While theoretically ranging from 
0-10, nobody gave the working class a score of 0 so markers begin at 1. The left-hand plot is 
based on Model 1 in Table OE5, while the right-hand plot is based on Model 2.  
Figure OE7: Candidate Evaluations Based on Class Identification and Candidate Information 
without or with Controls for Class Affect 
 
Note: Bars provide the predicted candidate evaluation for respondents based on the candidate 
they read about (x-axis) with 95% confidence intervals. Separate facets are provided based on 
respondents’ subjective class identity and type of model (left: does not control for working class 






Table OE1: Study 1 - Income Moderation 
 (1) (2) 
 Feeling Thermometer Feeling Thermometer 




   









   




   




   
Household Income 0.0132** 
(0.00438) 
  
   
Personal Income   0.0147
* 
(0.00591) 
   




   




   








   









Observations 1688 1745 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table OE2: Study 1, USA - Income Moderation 
 (1) (2) 
 Thermometer Vote Intention 




   




   




   






   






   




   






   






   






   
WC Appeal # 






   
UMC Appeal # 











Observations 1879 1879 
Adjusted R2 0.357 0.260 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table OE3: Study 2, Denmark - Income Moderation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 


















      








     




    
     




     








     




























Observations 1279 1279 1305 1305 
Adjusted R2 0.090 0.057 0.094 0.072 
Standard errors in parentheses 










Table OE4: Working Class Appeals and Occupation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Controllers Manual Laborers Interaction Model 






    















    






    






    
Lo Contrl     -0.03 
(0.04) 
    
RNM     -0.06 
(0.04) 
    
SE     -0.10 
(0.07) 
    
Manuals     -0.05 
(0.04) 
    
WC # Lo Contrl     0.02 
(0.05) 
    
WC # RNM     0.10
+ 
(0.06) 
    
WC # SE     0.07 
(0.11) 
    
WC # Manuals     0.16
** 
(0.06) 
    
UMC # Lo Contrl     -0.06 
(0.05) 
    




    
UMC # SE     0.09 
(0.11) 
    
UMC # Manuals     -0.13
* 
(0.06) 
    
SD # Lo Contrl     0.03 
(0.05) 
    
SD # RNM     0.10
+ 
(0.06) 
    
SD # SE     0.13 
(0.10) 
    
SD # Manuals     0.05 
(0.06) 
    
WC # SD # Lo Contrl     -0.01 
(0.08) 
    
WC # SD # RNM     -0.07 
(0.08) 
    
WC # SD # SE     -0.02 
(0.14) 
    
WC # SD # Manuals     -0.04 
(0.08) 
    
UMC # SD # Lo Contrl     -0.03 
(0.08) 
    
UMC # SD # RNM     -0.13 
(0.08) 
    
UMC # SD # SE     -0.22 
(0.15) 
    
UMC # SD # Manuals     -0.02 
(0.08) 









Observations 294 446 1832 
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.302 0.152 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table OE5: Class Affect and Reactions to Class Appeals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 












    








     








     













    -0.00105 
(0.0747) 
     
Upper Middle Class 
Affect 
  -0.0957 
(0.0955) 
  0.0996 
(0.0637) 
     






    
     






    
     






    
     
Subjective Social 
Class (Base = WC) 
    




     




     





Candidate Info * 
Subjective Class  
    
Venstre, WC. # 
Lower Middle Class 
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Venstre, WC. # 
Middle Class 




     
Venstre, WC. # 
Upper Middle Class 





     
SD, UMC. # Lower 
Middle Class 




     
SD, UMC. # Middle 
Class 




     
SD, UMC. # Upper 
Middle Class 





     
Lib, UMC. # Lower 
Middle Class 




     
Lib, UMC. # Middle 
Class 





     
Lib, UMC. # Upper 
Middle Class 














Observations 486 473 480 446 
Adjusted R2 0.266 0.225 0.271 0.263 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
